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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this study was to develop a fuzzy–based framework for the prioritization of health, safety and 
environment related risks posed against employees, working conditions, and process equipment in large gas 
refineries. The First Refinery at Pars Special Economic Energy Zone in South of Iran was taken as a case study. For 
this purpose, health, safety and environment related risks were determined based on the three criteria of impact 
severity, occurrence probability, and detect-ability using a questionnaire of 33 identified failures. The values 
obtained were processed by a so-called ‘contribution coefficient’. The results were then subjected to fuzzification 
and fuzzy rules were defined to calculate the risk level indices as the model outputs, which was then employed to 
facilitate the management decision-making process by prioritizing the management options. The prioritization 
values were then classified in six categories in the order of risk severity. Results revealed that failure in a 
combustion furnace had the highest rank while failure in the slug catcher ranked the lowest among the risk sources. 
It was also found that about 0.4% of the identified risks prioritized as “intolerable”, 79% as “major”, 20% as 
“tolerable”, and 0.7% as “minor”. Thus, most of the risks (more than 79%) associated with the refinery has the 
potential of significant risks. The results indicated that the risk of the pollutant emissions from the combustion 
furnaces is the highest. Exposures to harmful physical, chemical, psychological, and ergonomic substances are the 
other risks, respectively. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
HSE-MS (Health, Safety and Environment Management System) 
OP (Occurrence Probability) 
DA (Detect-ability) 
IS (Impact Severity) 
FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) 
ETA (Event Tree Analysis) 
RBM (Risk Based Maintenance) 
QADS (Assessment of Domino Scenarios) 
PSEEZ (Pars Special Economic Energy Zone) 
RL (Risks Levels) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Industrial environments, due to having the dangerous 
processes may lead to loss of life, injury, social and 
economic disruption or destruction of the 
environment. So, for these high-risk environments a 
structure called Health, safety and environmental 
management system (HSE- MS) was introduced as 
the important management approach in 1985. 
Actually this system was a reaction to probabilistic 
accident [1, 2]. 
There is close relationship between health, safety and 
environment; all these factors can affect people and 
their behavior [3]. Fig. 1 illustrates the relationship 
between the HSE components (independent 
variables) and performance indicators (dependent 
variables). Each HSE Components indicates a set of 
system aspects which are interrelated and assumed to 
have impact on together and on the performance 
indicators. 
Therefore, at an organizational level, injurious factors 
in the workplace could cause human failure and 
safety issues which would result in environmental 
risks [4, 5]. 
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HSE management system to reduce or minimize 
accidents in industrial environment uses a process 
called risk assessment. Risk assessment is vital 
demands for any industry to characterize their risks 
for staff, environment and loss of money. It is a 
systematic way of identifying which features of the 
workplace or work activities that could potentially 
cause harm, and then deciding what action to take to 
make them safe. In general, risk assessment is a 
complex process that entails the consideration of 
many qualitative parameters which are difficult to 
quantify [6]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The relationship between HSE components and their impact on performance components. 
The main objective underlying risk assessment 
programs is to provide the major portion of the 
information required for supporting the risk 
management program (that includes identification, 
selection, and implementation of appropriate 
measures to control the risk). 
Risk assessment is based on the three input variables 
including: occurrence probability (OP), detect-ability 
(DA), and impact severity (IS). Any measure aimed 
at reducing the risk (s) requires one or all of these 
three variables to be reduced [7]. The reliability of 
risk assessment results greatly relies on the accuracy 
of the model used and the verifiability of the risk data 
[8]. 
Risk assessment methods are classified in three 
categories including: (a) the qualitative techniques 
such as; check-lists, HAZOP and what-if analysis, (b) 
the hybrid techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Risk Based 
Maintenance (RBM), and (c) the quantitative 
techniques such as QRA, Quantitative Assessment of 
Domino Scenarios (QADS) and Weighted Risk 
Analysis (WRA) techniques [9, 10]. 
Because the traditional approaches cannot be to 
provide adequate answers to deal with this issue and 
using of them may mask other aspects of incomplete 
and imprecise knowledge and can lead to a Wrong 
impression of accuracy and precision for the 
decisions [11]. Moreover, in most cases, no adequate 
information is typically available for the reliable 
estimation of the frequency distribution or other 
characteristics of the risk factors [12, 13] and risk 
assessors are often faced with situations where the 
risk data are either incomplete or associated with a 
high level of uncertainty. It is, therefore, essential to 
develop a novel method of risk assessment that is 
capable of identifying the critical uncertainty [14]. To 
overcome these uncertainties, probabilistic risk 
analysis such fuzzy expert systems have been 
developed for states in which measured data about 
the precision and reliability of a system are restricted 
and expert knowledge is the only source of 
information available [15]. 
Fuzzy logic can be exploited to give better 
simulations of complex processes and vague or 
qualitative information. The concept of membership 
function in fuzzy theory will be useful for illustrating 
and understanding qualitative, ambiguous, or 
uncertain information [16]. Linguistic rules used in 
the structure of risk factors carry such vague 
information that can be best expressed by fuzzy logic. 
Fuzzy expert systems are transforming these rules to 
their mathematics equal. These systems have the 
capacity of developing the functionality of 
engineering systems and sets with linguistic terms in 
data analyzing, processing or decision-making [17]. 
Other advantages of fuzzy logic are facility and 
flexibility, because fuzzy logic can manipulate 
imprecise problems and it can model any arbitrary 
and complicated function [18, 19]. Within the HSE 
literature, application of optimizing tools in the 
management systems is used in a few studies. 
Assessment and development of HSE management 
systems are mainly important in Process Industries. 
Study about these systems in the context of HSE is 
introduced by many researchers. In this paper, an 
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optimization tool is applied to assess HSE risks in gas 
refineries. HSE management systems are evaluated 
by some researchers. 
Bernardo et al. (2009) Stated that the extent of 
environmental management systems are really 
Depended on the quality and other standardized 
management systems which implemented in 
organizations [20]. Azadeh et al. (2014a, 2014b) 
evaluated HSE systems of a gas transmission unit by 
Data Envelopment Analysis and also used Fuzzy 
Data Envelopment Analysis to decrease uncertainty 
existing in qualitative indicators and human risk 
failures [21, 22]. Gurcanli and Mungen (2009) and 
Beriha et al. (2012) provided a method for 
assessment of the risks that workers expose in 
construction sites using a fuzzy rule-based safety 
analysis to deal with uncertain and insufficient data. 
Using this method, historical accident data, 
judgments of experts, and the current safety level of a 
construction site merged together [23, 24]. Ciarapica 
and Giacchetta (2009) demonstrated the flexibility 
and advantages of the neuro-fuzzy network for 
occupational injury study. They analyzed injury data 
for developing classification schemes according to 
the trend in injury and subsequently, carried out a 
sensitivity analysis concerning the frequency of the 
injury [25]. Azadeh et al. (2008) have developed a 
fuzzy expert system for performance assessment of 
health, safety, environment (HSE) and ergonomics 
system factors in a gas refinery. It is demonstrated 
that use of fuzzy expert systems can reduce human 
failure, create expert knowledge and interpret large 
amount of vague data in an efficient manner [26]. 
Dejoy et al. (2004) stated employee’s attitudes play a 
vital role in safety issues. They also demonstrated 
that industrial accidents not only affect human capital 
but also generate financial losses due to disruptions 
in industrial processes, damages to Working process 
[27]. 
In the present study, a framework is presented based 
on fuzzy logic for the assessment of HSE risks and to 
prove its implementation to the quantitative 
characterization of the expert's opinion to the risk 
associated with the First Refinery at PSEEZ. The 
main objective of fuzzy modeling of health, safety 
and environment (HSE) risks is assisting the risk 
management process for the improvement of HSE 
conditions at workplace, by identifying, assessing 
and controlling risks to an acceptable level by using 
corrective or preventive actions. It helps determine 
risks factors with the highest priorities. Moreover, the 
overall advantage of using this method in modeling 
of HSE risks is reduced time and cost. To this end, in 
this study, a new method of classifying risks factors 
is developed. It will be able to use a fuzzy logic 
approach for accurate and precise prediction of 
accident in an uncertain environment when sufficient 
data are not available. 
 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
Study Area 
Pars Special Economic Energy Zone (PSEEZ) is 
located at approximately 105 km south of Pars Gas 
Field in the east of Bushehr Province along the 
coastlines of the Persian Gulf. The First Refinery is 
one of the 5 presently active of a total number of 24 
modules provisioned for this zone. The refinery 
supplies 25 MCM of treated gas on a daily basis into 
the national network. Also, two condensate 
stabilization units supply 40,000 barrels of 
condensate to storage tanks to be exported. The H2S 
be separated at the sweetening units transferred to the 
sulfur recovery units which produce a daily quantity 
of 200 tons of granulated sulfur which is transported 
by truck to automate sulfur storage. After the 
condensate from natural gas entering the refinery is 
removed, the remaining parts then treated in two 
operational units as shown in Fig. 2 [28]. 
 
Fig. 2. Flowchart of the natural gas treatment at the First Refinery at PSEEZ. 
Much of the capability of fuzzy logic lies in its ability 
to display ambiguous data, a capacity that much 
resembles human reasoning when dealing with 
inexact information or uncertainty in decision-
making. This theory by introducing expert knowledge 
into the system, human reasoning can be usefully 
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exploited for solving engineering problems and it 
provides a means for dealing with vague and 
uncertain information generated by any system [29, 
30]. The fuzzy logic method used in this study is 
presented in Fig. 3 and a detailed description of its 
steps is given below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Fuzzy risk assessment system. 
System Design 
Identification of Present Risks 
Risk assessment begins with the identification of 
process-related risks and potentially dangerous 
events, impacts, and their likely consequences. 
Indeed, the success of any project depends on the 
identification and detection of the associated risks at 
all the system levels. It is one of the most vital steps 
toward the perfection of a project safety [31]. In 
addition to Field investigations and detailed literature 
review, all efforts were made in this study to design a 
comprehensive and exhaustive questionnaire that 
could disclose and maximally benefit from the 
experience and knowledge gained by experts, 
engineers, and operators working in the industry. For 
this purpose, over 100 main risks were identified. 
Field investigations and expert views were then used 
to select 33 main risks from among the initial 100, 
which were exploited in designing the questionnaire. 
Determining the Decision-Making Criteria 
The process of selecting system criteria is based on 
the following two activities: 
(i) Investigation of the criteria used in previous 
studies; and 
(ii) Investigation of the HSE criteria deemed 
successful by managers and experts. 
Based on these investigations, the system input and 
output are determined and the components of 
occurrence probability (OP), detect-ability (DA), and 
impact severity (IS) are selected as inputs to the 
system while the HSE risks levels (RL) are 
determined as the output of the expert system 
designed. 
Designing the Fuzzy Sets for the Decision-Making 
Criteria 
In order to design the foundations of the fuzzy expert 
system, five fuzzy sets including “Low”, “Very 
Low”, “Moderate”, “High”, and “Very High” were 
designed for each of the main decision criteria to 
make a total number of15 fuzzy sets ( table 1, 2 , 3 
and Fig. 4). The fuzzy set thus obtained for each of 
the variables is as follows: 
OP  : { Very low, Low, Moderate, High, Very High} 
DA: {Very High, High, Moderate, Low, Very Low} 
IS: {Negligible, Marginal, Moderate, Severe, 
Catastrophic} 
Determination of Contribution Coefficients 
Considering the fact that each expert has his/her own 
contribution to the final results and given the fact that 
such factors as experience and education need to be 
emphasized in experts’ contributions, the responses 
made any experts were further processed using a 
specific contribution coefficient (W). For example, if 
the questionnaire was administered among n expert 
respondents, the with expert respondent would have a 
contribution coefficient of wi, where:  
>0.i= 1 and 1>w n+…+w2+w1w 
 
Table 1: Linguistic terms used for OP. 
Linguistic variable Description of the OP Failure value 
Very Low Occurrence probability is very low 0-2 
Low There is an occurrence probability but its frequency is low. 1-4 
Moderate Occurrence probability of the failure is at least once a year. 3-7 
High The failure is sure to occur at least once a year. 6-9 
Very High The failure is sure to occur at least a few times a year. 8-10 
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5. Defining the fuzzy expert system rules 
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4. Prioritization of 
decision- making options 
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Table 2: Linguistic terms used for DA. 
Linguistic variable 
Description of DA 
Failure 
value 
Very High Process-related risks are identified and alerted. 0-2 
High Risks are detected by tracking and auditing the current status, visual inspection, and/or daily 
monitoring. 
1-4 
Moderate Risks are completely identified and monitored empirically using reliable instruments. 3-7 
Low There is little likelihood that risks could be detected using the presently available monitoring and 
instruments. 
6-9 
Very Low There is no monitoring system in place or it is not capable of detecting potential risks. 8-10 
 
Table 3: Linguistic terms used for IS. 
Linguistic variable Description of IS Failure value 
Negligible The failure has no effect on the performance of the system or the operator. 0-2 
Marginal The failure has no effect on system performance but leads to small problems for the 
operator. 
1-4 
Moderate The failure causes a negligible but significant level of failure in the system and a high 
degree of trouble for the operator. 
3-7 
Severe The failure causes a significant destruction in system performance and minor injuries to 
the operator. 
6-9 
Catastrophic The failure causes destruction in the whole system and severe injuries to the operator. 
8-10 
 
 
Fig. 4: Definition of the fuzzy set for OP, DA and IS. 
Defining the Fuzzy Expert System Rules 
The Decision-Making Stage 
Fuzzification of the Input 
Fuzzification of system input accounts for the first 
processing stage by the fuzzy expert system. It is in 
this stage that the membership degree of each input in 
the corresponding fuzzy set and the membership 
degree of input variables proportional to the 
corresponding membership functions is determined 
[33]. The fuzzification stage designed in this study 
consists of two steps as described below. 
The inference core of an expert system consists of a 
set of if-then rules. In the fuzzy expert system, the 
rules are expressed by a series of linguistic 
expressions. The rules of the expert system then 
evaluate the favorable status against the option under 
study and determine the conformity of the favorable 
status to that of the option in question using a 
relevant linguistic expression [32]. For the fuzzy 
expert system used in this study, 125 (5×5×5) rules 
were defined, each being affected by five impact 
levels of each criterion. Table 5 presents some of 
these rules for illustration. 
Fuzzification of Inputs Variables 
For the fuzzification of the input data, each was 
assigned to one category using linguistic variables. 
As already mentioned, the categorization of input and 
output data was accomplished based on previous 
studies reported in the literature and according to the 
approach outlined in the Section on modeling 
algorithm. Then, the values assigned by the experts 
(0 to 10) for each of the three risk components were 
multiplied by the contribution coefficient obtained 
for each expert and the summation of the values thus 
obtained were taken as the processed value for the 
relevant component. For example, if the failure for 
HE1 is evaluated by an expert as in Table 6 below, 
and if the contribution coefficient assigned to the 
expert is designated by CC, then the normalized 
value for each of the three main risk components is 
calculated as the product of this coefficient and the 
value for the relevant component. Normalized values 
assigned by all the expert respondents to each 
component are then summed up as in Relations (1) to 
(3) below to obtain the processed value for the 
component in question. 
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Table 4: Some of the rules employed in the fuzzy expert system in this study. 
Rule No. Description 
R1 IF OP is very low and IS is negligible but DA is very high, THEN RL is minor. 
R2 IF OP is very low and IS is marginal but DA is very high, THEN RL is minor. 
R75 IF OP is very high but IS is catastrophic and DA is moderate, THEN RL is intolerable. 
R90 IF OP is average and IS is catastrophic but DA is low, THEN RL is intolerable. 
R106 IF OP is low, IS is negligible, and DA is very low, THEN, RL is tolerable. 
R121 IF OP is very high but IS is negligible and DA is very low, THEN RL is tolerable. 
R125 IF OP is very high and IS is catastrophic but DA is very low, THEN RL is intolerable. 
 
Table 5: Assessment value for a given risk assigned by an expert respondent. 
 
 
 
 
𝑃𝐼𝑆 = ∑ 𝐼𝑆. 𝐶𝐶
𝑛
𝑖=1              (1) 
 
𝑃𝑂𝑃 = ∑ 𝑂𝑃. 𝐶𝐶
𝑛
𝑖=1             (2) 
 
𝑃𝐷𝐴 = ∑ 𝐷𝐴. 𝐶𝐶
𝑛
𝑖=1             (3) 
For the purposes of this study, the trapezoidal 
membership functions expressed by Eq. 4 were used. 
The minimum and maximum values of the trapezoid 
were considered to vary from 0 to 1 as shown in Fig. 
5, where the parameters a and d represent the set of 
points of the base or that of the left and right bases, 
the parameters b and c represent the set of points on 
the shoulder or the upper side of the trapezoid, and x 
and y are the spatial coordinates of the reference 
points.  
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑓 = [𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑]   (4) 
 
Fig. 5. Example of a trapezoidal membership function. 
Finally, Eq. 5 is used for the fuzzification of the 
trapezoidal membership functions. 
 
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝑥−𝑎
𝑏−𝑎
, 1,
𝑑−𝑥
𝑑−𝑐
) , 0)     (5)  
Fuzzification of Output Variables 
The output variable in this study, which is the risk 
level index, is expressed by the four qualitative 
linguistic terms of minor, tolerable, high, and 
intolerable as shown in Table 7. As already 
mentioned, it is clear from Fig. 6 that the quantitative 
description of the risk is expressed by a trapezoidal 
membership function. 
Fuzzy Inference 
The fuzzy inference process accomplished in 
accordance with the rules defined for the system is 
the most important process performed by a fuzzy 
expert system. In this stage, fuzzy sets are created for 
each criterion to determine the compliance of each 
option for each criterion [34]. The principles of fuzzy 
logic in this process contribute to the development of 
an output fuzzy set through the combination of the 
IF–THEN fuzzy rules. These steps have been 
depicted clearly in Fig. 7. 
Defuzzification and Prioritization of Decision-
Making Options 
Defuzzification involves the weighting and 
normalization of all the outputs resulting from the 
whole set of fuzzy rules exclusively pertinent to a 
single decision or an output signal, which should be 
ultimately turned into an exact, non-fuzzy, and 
explicit value. In this study, the commonly used 
method of gravity center was employed to defuzzify 
the output. Once the level of each risk has been 
evaluated and its significance accordingly 
defuzzified, the risks are prioritized and a series of 
mitigation measures are introduced that will either 
reduce the risk or prevent unexpected events so that 
the decision-making process is facilitated. 
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Table 6: Linguistic terms of the RL. 
Linguistic variable Description of RL Failure value 
Minor Acceptable risk 0.0-0.3 
Tolerable Risk to be reduced commensurate with the cost 0.2-0.6 
Major Measures required for reducing the risk to a reasonable level. 0.5-0.9 
Intolerable  Risk should be reduced. 0.8-1.0 
 
Fig. 6. The fuzzy sets of the RL. 
 
Fig. 7. The fuzzy inference process. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Field investigations and expert views helped to 
identified 100 initial risks and then select 33 main 
risks which were then divided into the three health, 
safety, and environmental risks as reported in Table 
7. 
Defuzzification process resulted in calculating the 
risk levels together with the membership function for 
each risk (table 8). Once the level of each risk has 
been evaluated and its significance accordingly 
defuzzified, the priorities of the risks in the study 
area are presented according to their order of 
importance (Fig. 8 and table 9). Obviously, risks with 
higher levels in the fuzzy model are prioritized higher 
and waiting for urgent mitigation measures. Tables 8 
and 9 showed that about 0.4% of the risks faced with 
at the First Refinery at PSEEZ are prioritized as 
intolerable (EN1), 79% as major (such as HE1, HE2, 
SA1, etc.), and 20% as tolerable (such as SA2, SA11, 
SA15, etc.), and only about 0.7% prioritized minor 
level (SA16). These results indicate that a major 
portion of the risks (about 79%) is above the “major” 
level and that immediate measures are, therefore, 
needed within the environmental management 
scheme of the refinery to control and reduce them to 
acceptable levels. 
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Table7: Potential health, safety, and environmental risks identified. 
Risk type Risk code Description 
H
ea
lt
h
 (
H
E
) 
HE1 Exposure to harmful physical substances (noise, vibration, light, radiation, heat, and cold). 
HE2 Exposure to chemical substances (chemical gases and vapors, disinfectants, and drugs). 
HE3 Exposure to harmful biological substances (bacteria, viruses, fungi, etc.). 
HE4 Exposure to harmful psychological substances (stress, workload, shift work). 
HE5 Exposure to harmful ergonomic substances (monotonous and repetitive work, unsuitable body posture during 
working, and unsuitable work equipment)  
S
a
fe
ty
 (
S
A
) 
SA1 Exposure to high voltage current  
SA2 Fall into windows, channels, and slug catchers 
SA3 Falling from plantars and elevated corridors 
SA4 Amputations, fractures, or injuries in the head and face caused by collisions, blows, hits, and flying objects 
SA5 Explosion of boilers and pressurized systems or control valve overflows 
SA6 Explosion due to eruption of energy or excess pressure on tanks leading to tank explosion and gas emissions 
SA7 Defective leak detectors 
SA8 Failure of temperature and pressure control devices  
SA9 Blockage in gas condensate lines 
SA10 Blockage in air outlet valves and throttle valves 
SA11 Malfunctioning of the safety/pressure valves 
SA12 Fires due to electric sparks 
SA13 Fires caused by tank failure and chemical leakage 
SA14 Fires caused by failure in gas transmission lines 
SA15 Failure in the filtering system (pig receiver & pig launcher) 
SA16 Failure in the slug catcher system 
SA17 Failure in the pressure breaking system (powered valves) 
SA18 Failure in the separator system 
SA19 Failure in the cooling system (Air Cooler) 
SA20 Failure in compressors, pumps, and condensers 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l 
(E
N
) 
EN1 Pollutant emissions from the combustion furnaces (CO2, CO, NOx, SOx, and PM) 
EN2 Pollutant emissions from fellers. 
EN3 Emission of volatile pollutants due to leakage from equipment, tanks, fractures, cracks, and joints. 
EN4 Soil and groundwater contamination due to leakage of various hydrocarbons from the main gas pipe lines and 
pipe fittings 
EN5 Hydrocarbon pollution of seawater due to discharge of process water into the environment 
EN6 Pollution of seawater with chlorine compounds due to coolant discharge into the environment. 
EN7 Noise pollution at the refinery due to compressors, fellering, and other equipment 
EN8 Noise pollution in the surrounding are 
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Table 8: Ultimate risks levels and the membership function for each risk. Safety Science 
Failure type 
OP IS DA RL Membership functions of the RL 
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable 
HE1 6.17 6.84 3.25 0.72 - - 100%   
HE2 4.85 6.07 5.26 0.70 - - 100%   
HE3 3.52 4.78 4.00 0.56 - 40% 60%   
HE4 4.69 5.91 5.01 0.70 - - 100%   
HE5 5.06 6.57 4.11 0.70 - - 100%   
SA1 5.13 5.51 4.86 0.70 - - 100%   
SA2 3.15 5.36 2.99 0.45 - 100% -   
SA3 4.27 6.62 4.71 0.70 - - 100%   
SA4 3.51 5.85 5.02 0.56 - 40% 60%   
SA5 4.43 6.21 5.26 0.70 - - 100%   
SA6 4.43 6.25 4.98 0.70 - - 100%   
SA7 5.19 5.89 5.12 0.70 - - 100%   
SA8 3.62 5.10 5.22 0.58 - 25% 75%   
SA9 4.19 5.51 4.64 0.70 - - 100%   
SA10 4.98 5.68 5.11 0.70 - - 100%   
SA11 3.08 6.10 3.35 0.44 - 100% -   
SA12 5.65 6.35 4.97 0.70 - - 100%   
SA13 5.33 7.07 4.50 0.70 - - 100%   
SA14 5.44 6.10 5.18 0.70 - - 100%   
SA15 3.20 5.00 4.96 0.46 - 100% -   
SA16 1.47 3.38 3.51 0.29 20% 80% -   
SA17 5.90 6.06 5.32 0.70 - - 100%   
SA18 5.29 5.80 5.38 0.70 - - 100%   
SA19 5.20 6.08 5.23 0.70 - - 100%   
SA20 4.88 5.79 5.47 0.70 - - 100% 10% 
EN1 7.29 8.69 4.78 0.81 -  - 90%   
EN2 5.35 6.54 4.83 0.70 - - 100%   
EN3 5.23 6.40 4.62 0.70 - - 100%   
EN4 6.27 7.52 3.85 0.72 - - 100%   
EN5 7.29 7.02 4.46 0.70 - - 100%   
EN6 6.68 6.54 6.27 0.73 - - 100%   
EN7 5.97 6.67 5.45 0.70 - - 100%   
EN8 3.46 6.52 4.80 0.56 - 40% 60%  
 
Table 9: Prioritization of the HSE risks of the First Refinery at PSEEZ. 
Risk priority Risk type 
1 EN1 
2 
HE1, HE2, HE4, HE5, SA1, SA3, SA5, SA6, SA7, SA9, SA10, SA12, SA13, SA14, SA17, SA18, SA19, SA20, EN2, EN3, 
EN4, EN5, EN6, EN7 
3 SA8 
4 HE3, SA4, EN8 
5 SA2, SA11, SA15 
6 SA16 
 
Further details are presented in Figs.10 to 14. Where, 
Fig. 9 presents a 3D diagram in which HSE risk 
levels (the “y” axis) is plotted versus two components 
of impact severity (“x” axis) and occurrence 
probability (“z” axis). Clearly, about 70% of the 
weight assigned to the rules belongs to low and 
marginal risks (Light and dark blue colors in Fig. 9). 
In other words, only 30% of the total weight of the 
risks levels is assigned to risks that need more urgent 
consideration and for which mitigation measures 
need to be taken in order to reduce them to 
acceptable levels (Light and dark green colors in Fig. 
9), because from the 33 identified risks only 9 cases 
of them (30 percent) from the perspective of experts 
Have been placed in the high and critical Risk levels. 
The following diagrams (Figs. 10, 11, and 13) of the 
impact of each variable on the ultimate calculated RL 
the contribution of each of the three risk components 
to the ultimate RL. 
Based on the three main model parameters and their 
individual contributions to the ultimate RL, the 
effects of the components on the risk level are 
individually illustrated in Figs. 10 to 12. In overall, 
special importance should be attached to OP due to 
the likelihood of a wide variety of events in the study 
area and the risky nature of the specific operations 
that gives rise to chain incidents leading to 
environmental disasters. As can be seen in Fi.10, a 
slight increase in the OP has an increasing effect on 
the ultimate risk. 
It is clear that impact severity has a delayed effect on 
the ultimate RL such that its increased level does not 
directly lead to increased ultimate risk but that it 
often causes step like increments in a delayed 
manner. This may be attributed to the fact that no 
1 
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accurate estimate of the losses in occupational 
environment, employees, or process equipment can 
be made until a potential event is actually realized on 
the ground. Fig. 11 depicts the effect of IS on the 
ultimate RL. 
Unlike the other two factors, DA is inversely related 
to risk level. As can be seen in Fig. 12, even a slight 
effect on DA leads to a major failure to timely detect 
incidents which, in turn, leads to exponentially 
increasing risk levels. It may, therefore, be concluded 
that risk probability is most affected by the ability to 
detect and predict potential risks. Naturally, this may 
be considered as the most important output of the risk 
assessment fuzzy model because technical, 
engineering, and management control systems could 
have more emphasize on failure detect-ability. 
Enhanced potential for failure detection will 
evidently lead to reduced risk levels. Finally, this will 
help reduce challenges facing the industry and the 
environment so that the economic, social, and 
environmental consequences are prevented in a 
timely manner. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Three dimensional diagram of the risks plotted versus Impact Severity and Occurrence Probability. 
Fig. 13 shows the aggregation of three components 
mentioned above. The aggregation of the three 
components creates a diagram similar to that of the 
effects of OP factors on RL, which represents the 
high influence of OP in balancing RL. Therefore, the 
temporal component can be used in the absence of 
the other two components to estimate the RL. 
The HSE assessment system developed in this 
research presents a method for quantifying HSE 
categories and provides a sort of prioritization. This 
framework has the potential to consider statistical 
uncertainty inherent in the risk management system. 
It is also applicable in different conditions and 
different processes of the industries. Moreover, this 
method can be easily modified and expanded to be 
incorporated in other possible HSE components. 
In order to compare the results obtained by the 
proposed model and the outputs of other researchers; 
the presented result are consistent with a number of 
studies such as A. Pinto1 et al. (2010). Their findings 
indicate that, Fuzzy approaches for human-centered 
problems seem to be quite flexible; hence in this 
work we introduce a preliminary version of a 
qualitative method for risk assessment by using the 
fuzzy logic concepts and techniques [6]. 
The other researchers have tried to a framework as 
simple as possible that the approach be easily 
applicable. Juglaret et al., (2011) and Amir-Heidari et 
al. (2016) also have reported simple and logical 
structure with a strong philosophical and 
mathematical framework which, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no similar research previously 
[35, 36]. Therefore, our general two-stage innovative 
framework which is based on fuzzy risk assessment 
can be used by any kind of organization or company 
for measuring qualitative performances, including 
HSE performance. In this line, Markowski and 
Mannan (2008) and Sa'idi et al. (2014) showed that 
different studies indicated that the traditional risk 
matrix model does not fit the practical data but the 
fuzzy model fitted the data very well [37, 38]. 
In the present study, fuzzy probabilistic rules were 
extracted from association rules. The introduced 
methodology prevents from losing information while 
using Confidential information and non-quantitative 
(i.e., probabilities) in investigating HSE process.  
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Fig. 10. Diagram of RL versus OP  
Fig. 11. Diagram of RL versus IS. 
 
Fig. 12. Diagram of RL versus DA. 
 
Fig. 13. Diagram of the aggregation of the three 
components of OP, IS, and DA. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a fuzzy-based framework was 
developed for risk assessment of process operations 
in the large gas refineries. Therefore, 100 main risks 
were selected and 33 most important risks were 
identified through by using of the expert opinions and 
as partially were analyzed for risk assessment, then 
they were prioritized in the final structure.  
The results showed that the risk of pollutant 
emissions from the combustion furnaces (CO2, CO, 
NOx, SOx, and PM) is the highest. Exposure to 
harmful physical substances (noise, vibration, light, 
radiation, heat, and cold), exposure to chemical 
substances (chemical gases and vapors, disinfectants, 
and drugs), exposure to harmful psychological 
substances (stress, workload, shift work), exposure to 
harmful ergonomic substances (monotonous and 
repetitive work, unsuitable body posture during 
working, and unsuitable work equipment) are another 
risks for the First Refinery at Pars Special Economic 
Energy Zone in South of Iran, respectively. 
This model is heavily dependent on the real 
conditions in these industries. In this model, data thus 
obtained were fuzzified and 125 rules were 
subsequently defined at the fuzzy inference step to 
convert the three input variables into the risk level 
indices. Thus, a novel method of risk assessment was 
developed based on elicited data and using a fuzzy 
logic approach. In many cases, HSE risk analysis is a 
complex task that is associated with a high level of 
uncertainty due to a wide variety of reasons such as 
complexity of human behavior and environment, 
inadequacy of the present knowledge, insufficient 
data, and subjective expert judgments. Therefore, the 
proposed model is a useful and applicable model to 
deal with uncertainties in which qualitative and fuzzy 
data can be compatibly used together. The model 
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considers the weights of the three risk components 
(i.e., occurrence probability, detect-ability, and 
impact severity) in the process of creating a set of 
fuzzy rules. This is a new attempt of accounting for 
relative weights, which is consistent with objective 
reality. Lie et al. (2015) applied experts' weights and 
fuzzy logic to assess the performance HSE system 
and they concluded that this combination as well as 
the assessment result by degree of membership is 
more reasonable for HSE performance classification 
[39], which is our study major finding. Despite its 
advantages, the model has certain limitations. The 
continuous intervals of input and output variables 
artificially discretized leads to a set of discrete rules; 
as well as Weights are assigned to the risk factors 
solely on the basis of expert judgments rather than 
real measured data. This limitation calls for the 
collection of more data and the development of a 
more robust method (e.g., a fuzzy neural network) to 
reduce the associated uncertainties. It is obvious the 
prediction of various types of failures can help the 
managers to improve safety performance. Therefore, 
this model can be applied for assessing HSE risks of 
other industries. Albeit, the risk scales must be 
localized for any different conditions which may 
have a specific refinery. 
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